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ACTION AF-00

INFO	LOG-00	NP-00	AID-00	USNW-00	INL-00	PERC-00	DS-00
	EUR-00	OIGO-00	FBIE-00	H-00	TEDE-00	INR-00	IO-00
	LAB-01	M-00	NEA-00	DCP-00	NSCE-00	OIC-00	OMB-00
	NIMA-00	GIWI-00	FMPC-00	IRM-00	SSO-00	SS-00	SCRS-00
	DSCC-00	PRM-00	DRL-00	G-00	SAS-00	SWCI-00	/001W

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FM AMEMBASSY NDJAMENA  
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 1883  
INFO DARFUR COLLECTIVE  
AMEMBASSY LONDON  
AMEMBASSY PARIS  
AMEMBASSY YAOUNDE  
USMISSION USUN NEW YORK  
USLO TRIPOLI  
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S E C R E T NDJAMENA 001020

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DEPARTMENT FOR AF, AF/C, AF/SPG, D, DRL, DS/ICI/ATA,  
DS/ICI/AF, INR, INR/GGI, PRM, USAID/OTI AND USAID/W FOR  
DAFURMT; LONDON AND PARIS FOR AFRICAWATCHERS; GENEVA FOR  
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E.O. 12958: DECL: 06/20/2015

TAGS: [PGOV](#) [PHUM](#) [PREF](#) [CD](#) [SU](#)

SUBJECT: CHADIAN REBELS, RUMORS, REALITIES, AND REACTIONS

REF: A. KHARTOUM IIR 6 890 0290 05

- [1](#)B. NDJAMENA 835
- [1](#)C. NDJAMENA 565
- [1](#)D. NDJAMENA 658
- [1](#)E. NDJAMENA 946

Classified By: Political/Economic Officer Kathleen FitzGibbon for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d).

[1](#)1. (S NF) Summary: Speculation about the existence of Chadian rebel groups continues to make Chadians uneasy about the regime's stability. The often conflicting reports and wide-ranging opinions about the size, composition, capabilities, and agendas of Chadian rebel groups make it difficult to judge the nature of their threat to the regime. Most observers believe there are Chadian rebels, loosely defined, in several groups along the Sudanese border. However, no one agrees on the numbers of the rebels or the exact threat they pose to the Government of Chad. The GOC acknowledges the existence of the rebel groups, but tends to play down its concerns to outsiders. Nonetheless, the GOC itself is helping to heighten tensions by continuing to question, detain, and arrest journalists, who refuse to divulge their sources of open letters from allegedly rebel movements. The journalists are being charged with printing information to incite a revolt. We appreciate Embassy Khartoum's reporting on this issue. End Summary.

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PLAN OF ATTACK  
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[1](#)2. (S NF) In recent weeks, several Embassy sources including area residents, African Union observers, and members of the Darfur rebel movements have outlined pieces of a plan by Chadian rebels to launch an attack in July or August, during the raining season which corroborate reporting from Khartoum (Ref A). The most specific report about rebel plans that we have received comes from Abdelkader Yacine Bakhit, who was an advisor to former Prime Minister Kabadi and is the uncle of the Sultan of Goz Beida. The information passed to us from the Sultanate through Bakhit indicates that the various rebel groups have mobile training camps and move between Darfur and the Chadian border. The rebels believe that it will be difficult for the Chadian military to maneuver to defend itself. The Government of Sudan reportedly intends to use jandjaweed (many of whom are Chadian Arabs) and the Chadian rebel groups to attack Chad along the Kaja and Azoum Rivers during a three month window beginning in July or August.

[1](#)3. (S NF) According to this information, the rebels' actual targets are unspecified, but attacks allegedly might occur near Tissi, Dagassou, Modoihyria and Ade, in the Sila Department of Chad south of Abeche. These sources in Goz Beida also believe that there may be a link between some of these rebel groups and Mahamat Nour. Two other rebel leaders

mentioned are Adeledigue and Al Jinead, who are allegedly being supplied by Khartoum. Their goal, according to these sources, is regime change. After seizing power from President Deby, the jandjaweed leaders associated with the Chadian rebels and others reportedly will be able to escape justice for crimes committed in Darfur.

14. (S NF) The Goz Beida sources identified nine training camps for Chadian rebels. There also are reportedly five jandjaweed leaders from Arab tribes, including the Salamat and the Rachid tribes, and other individuals from the Mimi and Ouaddai tribes, who are involved with the Arab Chadian rebel leaders, which may include at least 12 colonels from the Chadian army. It is not clear whether they are all deserters or are currently on active duty. Increased criminal and rebel activity has resulted in the formation of self-defense forces in the Goz Beida region and caused the migration of many residents to Goz Beida and Goz Amir. On May 15, UNHCR and ICRC reported 4,000 displaced Chadians in the area who are too afraid to go to their homes. (Ref B.) On May 31, jandjaweed or Chadian rebels kidnapped three persons, but returned them to Goz Amir three days later. Some 200 women collected 5,000 Sudanese pounds to hire armed men to protect them and their livestock.

15. (S NF) A visiting British military officer traveled to Guereda to investigate some of the rumors about Chadian rebels in the area (Ref A). Guereda is north of Abeche, east of Koulbous, a key border crossing area. He told P/E officer and DATT on June 24 that there may be some 300 rebels in and around Guereda. Some of the local residents described the presence of a large group of armed men between Guereda and the border with Sudan. He also was told that the objective of the group was regime change, but that the capabilities of the group were not clear. He also heard that Chadian rebels plan to attack during the rainy season. Local residents also told him that the area was almost devoid of young men who may have joined up with various rebel groups.

16. (S NF) Some Chadian Army officers may be in regular contact with jandjaweed members, Chadian Arabs, and Chadian rebels along the border. The Chadian military often conducts raids near and across the border to retrieve stolen cattle and camels from jandjaweed and bandits. DRL officers were present during a meeting between Chadian Army officer, jandjaweed, and other unnamed Chadian Arabs near Birak on March 27 where the return of stolen livestock was being negotiated. All of the participants in the meeting were heavily armed, many were wearing watches showing Sudan time on them. Local residents and humanitarian organizations note that these types of interactions occur frequently along the border as the various players, government and non-government negotiate and barter over valuable commodities like cattle, camels, arms, and fuel.

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CHAIN REACTION  
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17. (S NF) We also are attempting to corroborate information that there may be some attempts by rebel political and military factions to coordinate their anti-government activities. At the same time, there is some collaboration among the political opposition and some army officers in N'Djamena to counter an attempt by Mahamat Nour, Chadian rebels, or coup plotters to seize power. On June 28, P/E officer discussed the recent press articles about Nour and his forces with General Damyo, the former Governor of Moyen Chari who is now in N'Djamena. Damyo knows Nour well and said that his objective is seizing power in N'Djamena. In Damyo's opinion, a Nour-launched attack could start a chain of events which would quickly get out of control. He doubts that Nour could seize power, but his actions could prove destabilizing. According to Damyo, he and other army officers are worried that there is no real plan in place to manage a non-violent transition should the Deby regime fall. Damyo said that there have been a number of meetings between army officers to come to agreement on scenarios for a smooth political transition.

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KEEPING A REBEL SCORECARD?  
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18. (S NF) We have pieced together tidbits of information from a variety of sources, including local press and offered other information in previous reporting. (Refs C and D.) There is some speculation that ethnic factors might be inhibiting coordination among these groups. Allegedly, the Arab leaders refuse to submit to the Tama-dominated groups. The difficulty of movement posed by terrain, beefed up border patrols, and lack of communications also may be hampering various players from coalescing into a cohesive movement. In terms of numbers, we have heard a range of figures from 300 to 1,000.

¶9. (U) Mahamat Nour clearly is the most talked-about Chadian rebel. A former member of the National Alliance for the Resistance (ANR), Nour and his group allegedly received training and support from the GOS and Libya. Nour was trained in France and Senegal. He was pictured and quoted in the independent newspaper Le Temps (May 18-24) as saying that he intended to take power, put in place a transition that would last one year, and organize free and fair elections in Chad. His group includes Bechir Hamdan, Abdallah Gogue

(operations commander), and Ismail Idriss. Another member of the former ANR with alleged ties to Nour, Col. Saroua, was arrested in Chad by the National Security Agency (ANS) on September 24, 2004. He may have been released, but we have no current information on his whereabouts.

¶10. (U) United Democratic Liberation's (UDL) leader is Ousman Fall. No other information available.

¶11. (U) Revolutionary Movement's (MMR) leader may be Abdullah Ramadan (not the same Ramadan of the Sudan Liberation Movement). Ramadan is a former FROLINAT member who worked closely with Abass Koty.

¶12. (U) Democratic and Revolutionary Council's (CDR) political leader is Acheikh Ibn Omar, former Foreign Minister and Chadian Ambassador to Washington, now living in Paris. CDR's military wing may be led by Colonel Hassan Saleh Al Ghadam, better known as Al Jineidi. He is a army officer of Arab descent who was trained at the military academy in Tripoli. Al Jineidi reportedly operates in the Dar Sila and Salamat area of Chad. His forces allegedly work closely with the jandjaweed, but also benefit from the complicity of local officials.

¶13. (U) National Resistance Council (CNR) is rumored to be led by Hissein Koty, a relation of assassinated Zaghawa-Kobe leader Abass Koty. This group courts disaffected Zaghawa.

¶14. (U) We also have heard about the existence of another rebel group comprised of ethnic Ouaddai. There also is rebel activity along Chad's southern border with the Central African Republic. A gang of unidentified Chadian rebels or bandits reportedly attacked a village along the CAR and Cameroon on June 15. Security forces reportedly killed ten members of the group which had been terrorizing villages and holding children for ransom. The group include Zaghawas who helped bring CAR President Bozize to power.

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GOVERNMENT REACTION  
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¶15. (S NF) RSO met with Minister for Public Security Abderahman Moussa on June 23. Moussa identified Nour, Col. Soubiane (brother or nephew of the former Chadian Ambassador to the United States), and a third rebel by name. Moussa expressed confidence that the Government of Chad knows the limitations and capabilities of these groups. He also noted that the GOC is in the initial stages of creating a new security reaction force composed of gendarmes and nomadic guard, which a new decree has placed under his control. Local authorities report additional deployments of Chadian military in the east in response to the potential threat posed by armed banditry, jandjaweed incursions, ethnic conflict between the Zaghawa and Ouaddai tribes, and Chadian rebel groups.

¶16. (S NF) One indication of the government's concerns over the Chadian rebels and other opponents, such as the Kreida, is that several journalists have been picked up by the National Security Agency (ANS) or the Ministry of Public Security. (Ref E) On June 16, Mahamat Garonde Djarma, a former Minister of Interior and occasional pundit, was picked up by the ANS on June 16 for an article published in Le Temps critical of the regime. On June 22, Michael Didama, the director of Le Temps, was arrested for "printing material to incite a revolt". On June 4, Samory Ngaradoumbe of L'Obserateur was arrested by the ANS and then released on June 6 by Public Security after the newspaper printed an open complaint letter from the Kreida ethnic group. He was re-arrested on June 20, charged with publishing material to incite a revolt, and is in jail.

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COMMENT  
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¶17. (C) It is difficult to determine the exact threat the rebels pose to the Government. We estimate that at the very least, the presence of a small, motivated group could have a

destabilizing effect in the east and, if allied, with groups in N'Djamena, ignite a serious of anti-regime actions. The GOC remains concerned about its opponents, regardless of its

stated confidence. The reported presence of the rebels in the east, public disapproval for the government voiced through the low turn-out for the referendum, the disaffection of the Kreida ethnic group along Lake Chad, insecurity along its southern and eastern border, and the circulation of rumors about President Deby's health all are contributing to heightened tensions in Chad. Embassy N'Djamena appreciates the efforts of DAO Khartoum and other Embassy officers in passing along information from the Sudanese side of the border. We are pursuing our efforts to collect and verify information about the Chadian rebels from this side of the border.

18. (U) Khartoum and Tripoli Minimize Considered.  
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